 
in the fourth place, the new deal gave a go-ahead signal to organized 
labor. 
up to this time such laws as seemed to authorize collective bargaining, 
like the clayton act, had frequently been nullified by the courts. 
but now the norris-laguardia anti-injunction act of 1932 was follwed by 
section 7a of the national industrial recovery act of 1933, and, after that law 
had been set aside by the supreme court, by the wagner act. 
the authorization to organize being clear and specific, there was a rush to 
join unions. 
through its general sympathy with labor, the new deal had unleashed what 
j.[kenneth galbraith has subsequently called a "countervailing force" in the 
american economy, a force which, acting in opposition to business managements, 
and generating for the time being a formidable amount of friction, served to 
bring about a redistribution of the national income downward to those in the 
lower income brackets. 
finally, the new deal tried to do a job of managing the national economy as 
a whole. 
it abandoned the automatically operating gold standard and introduced 
something approaching a managed currency. 
it abandoned the idea that the first duty of a government was to balance 
its budget, and embraced the keynesian idea of deficit spending, with the 
highly optimistic notion that deficits in bad years would be counterbalanced 
by surpluses in good years. 
whatever the dangers inherent in such a dream, at least the idea became 
pretty solidly established that it was the job of the authorities at 
washington so to manipulate their spending and their fiscal controls that the 
economy would run on a reasonably even keel. 
the result of all these interventions, the reform measures, the subsidies 
and guarantees, the public works, the encouragement of labor, and the attempt 
to steer the economy as a whole, was certainly not a socialist order, at least 
in the old sense of the government's taking over the management of business and 
industry. 
