 
during the cuban missile crisis, the president not only received 
information from all the significant departments, but went to considerable 
lengths to ensure that he was not insulated from individuals or points of view 
because of rank or position. 
he wanted the advice of his cabinet officers, but he also wanted the 
opinion of those who were connected with the situation itself. 
he wanted to hear from secretary rusk, but he also wished to hear from 
tommy thompson, former (and now again) ambassador to the soviet union, whose 
advice on the russians and predictions as to what they would do were uncannily 
accurate and whose advice and recommendations were surpassed by none; from ed 
martin, assistant secretary for latin america, who organized our effort to 
secure the backing of the latin american countries; also from george ball, the 
under secretary of state, whose advice and judgment were invaluable. 
he wanted to hear from secretary mcnamara, but he wanted to hear also from 
under secretary gilpatric, whose ability, knowledge, and judgment he sought in 
every serious crisis. 
on other occasions, i had frequently observed efforts being made to 
exclude certain individuals from participating in a meeting with the president 
because they held a different point of view. 
often, the president would become aware of this fact and enlarge the 
meetings to include other opinions. 
at the missile-crisis conferences he made certain there were experts and 
representatives of different points of view. 
president kennedy wanted people who raised questions, who criticized, on 
whose judgment he could rely, who presented an intelligent point of view, 
regardless of their rank or viewpoint. 
he wanted to hear presented and challenged all the possible consequences of 
a particular course of action. 
the first step might appear sensible, but what would be the reaction of our 
adversaries and would we actually stand to gain? 
